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The Ten Dollar Attorney Fee Limitation
and Preclusion of Judicial Review in the
Veterans Administration
Introduction
Congress has made adjudicatory practice before the Veterans Ad-
ministration (VA) different from other federal administrative practice in
two respects. It prohibits veterans from paying attorneys more than ten
dollars for representation in matters regarding disability benefits from
the VA, I and it precludes veterans from appealing final VA decisions to a
federal court.2 The right to retain an attorney and the right to judicial
review are two common procedural safeguards in the American system
of justice. These safeguards are partially the result of the due process
guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and of the free
speech, association, and petition guarantees of the First Amendment. In
Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors,3 however, a plu-
rality of the Supreme Court held that the VA ten dollar attorney fee limi-
tation is not unconstitutional on its face.
This Note examines whether veterans and their dependents are de-
nied procedural due process and first amendment protection by Congress
and the VA. It first reviews VA benefits and procedures and provides a
brief synopsis of the Walters decision. It then discusses the law regarding
procedural due process, the First Amendment, and the right to an attor-
ney, applies it to the facts in Walters, and proposes that Congress adopt a
more moderate set of attorney fee limitations. Next, the Note analyzes
whether the Constitution requires judicial review of agency decisions
and, if not, whether judicial review is the most desirable way of ensuring
the veteran's right to a neutral adjudication by the VA. Finally, this Note
proposes that Congress adopt certain measures that will make VA adjudi-
cations more neutral.
I. VA Benefits and Procedures
In 1930, Congress established the VA to administer benefits pro-
grams for veterans.4 With an annual budget of twenty-two billion dol-
l. 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c)(2) (1982).
2. Id. at § 211(a).
3. 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985).
4. Id. at 3183.
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lars, the VA is the third largest federal agency employing nearly 200,000
people.' The VA administers two types of benefit programs: those re-
warding veterans for their service, and those compensating veterans and
their families for service-connected disabilities.6 Only veterans seeking
the latter type of benefit are subject to the ten dollar attorney fee limita-
tion7 and precluded from judicial review.'
In 1978, approximately 800,000 claims were made for veteran disa-
bility benefits; the VA approved over 400,000 of these claims.9 There are
three types of VA disability benefits: compensation, pensions, and medi-
cal care. Veterans with service-connected disabilities receive VA com-
pensation on a monthly basis.10 Veterans with total and permanent
disabilities receive pensions on the basis of their indigency.1 Finally,
veterans with service-connected disabilities are eligible for medical, hos-
pital, or domiciliary care; and those who are over sixty-five years old or
indigent are also eligible for hospital or domiciliary care. 2
To keep VA benefit application procedures "informal and nonadver-
sarial,"13 Congress requires VA personnel to help veterans prepare their
claims;14 directs VA adjudicatory panels to resolve all reasonable doubts
5. Milford & Simon, Is Uncle Sam Toying with Veterans?, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
316, 318 (1982).
6. Id.
7. 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c)(2) (1982).
8. Id. at § 211(a). See infra note 33.
9. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3183.
10. 38 U.S.C. §§ 310, 321, 331, 341, 410 (1982); id. at § 315 (1985) (compensation to
veterans is based solely on the severity of the veteran's disability). Compensation to the depen-
dents of veterans who died as a result of their service is based on the veteran's pay grade and
number of children. Id. at §§ 411, 413. Compensation is also awarded to the parents of de-
ceased veterans if the parents are indigent. Id. at § 415 (1982).
11. Id. at § 521. Veterans of the Mexican Border Conflict of 1915 and of subsequent
conflict periods are covered by the statute, while veterans of the Indian Wars and Spanish-
American War are generally not covered by the need and income based pension; however,
veterans of those earlier wars may under certain circumstances opt into the disability benefits
available to the veterans of subsequent conflicts if they forego their flat rate pension. Cf Gil-
lan, Legal Issues in Veterans Benefits Legislation: Programs for the Elderly, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 839, 840-41 (1976). Dependent survivors of deceased veterans of most recent wars are
awarded pensions on the basis of their service connection and indigency. See generally 38
U.S.C. §§ 541, 543 (1982).
12. See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 610, 612 (1985).
13. See Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3191-92, 3196; see also infra notes 126, 135-145 and accom-
panying text.
14. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (1985) requires all VA personnel to provide claimants with
"every benefit that can be supported in law while protecting the interests of the Government."
But see National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302, 1320 n. 17 (N.D.
Cal. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985) [hereinafter Radiation Survivors]:
[This] raises a question as to the extent to which it is possible to serve the interests of
both the VA and claimants simultaneously. Clearly the financial interests of these
two parties may often conflict, and it is not inconceivable that VA personnel might
feel some pressure to protect the government purse.
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in favor of the veteran;' 5 makes veterans' hearings "ex parte in nature"
where no government official opposes the veteran;' 6 allows certain veter-
ans' organizations to represent veterans in the claims process, at no ex-
pense to the government or the veteran;17 and establishes no statute of
limitations,'" formal res judicata, 19 or formal rules of evidence and trial
procedure.2" The veteran, nevertheless, is still confronted with a variety
of governing statutes, regulations, opinions, and memoranda"1 in addi-
tion to a complex appellate procedure."2
A veteran initiates his or her disability claim by applying to a VA
regional office, where the claim is rated by a VA "rating board."2 3 If the
rating board denies the claim, the veteran has sixty days to submit new
evidence or request a VA hearing by a three member regional office
board.2" If the claim is denied a second time, the veteran may appeal to
the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA). z5
15. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (1985):
It is the defined and consistently applied policy of the Veterans Administration to
administer the law under a broad interpretation, consistent, however, with the facts
shown in every case. When, after careful consideration of all procurable and assem-
bled data, a reasonable doubt arises regarding service origin, the degree of disability,
or any other point, such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant.
16. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3183 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (1985)). An exparte pro-
ceeding is a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding where the rights of one of the parties to a
controversy are adjudicated in that party's absence. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 517 (5th ed.
1979).
17. 38 C.F.R. §§ 14.626, 14.634(a) (1986). The four largest organizations are the Ameri-
can Legion, the American National Red Cross, Disabled American Veterans, and Veterans of
Foreign Wars. 38 U.S.C. § 3402 (a)(1) (Supp. 11983). The representatives of these organiza-
tions need not be attorneys, 38 C.F.R. §§ 14.626-629 (1985), and generally are not: "The VA
statistics show that 86% of all claimants are represented by service representatives, 12% pro-
ceed pro se, and 2% are represented by lawyers." Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3184 n.4.
18. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3184.
19. Res judicata prohibits relitigation of a claim after a final decision on the claim's merits
has been rendered by a court with proper personal and subject matter jurisdiction. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (5th ed. 1979). The veteran may relitigate a claim as long as
new facts are presented in the second proceeding. Waiters, 105 S. Ct. at 3184.
20. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3 183-84 (the VA is directed to consider any evidence offered by
the claimant).
21. See Radiation Survivors, 589 F. Supp. at 1319. The memoranda include a Board of
Veterans Appeals (BVA) Manual, adjudication memoranda, VA circulars, and other informal
memoranda. Id. These documents influence decisions at the local, regional, and national
levels, but are seldom cited. See Milford & Simon, supra note 5, at 319.
22. See infra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
23. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3183. The board consists of a medical specialist, a legal special-
ist, and an occupational therapist. 38 C.F.R. § 3.151 (1985). See also Radiation Survivors, 589
F. Supp. at 1318.
24. 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(d) (1985).
25. Prior to a BVA appeal, the veteran must file a "Notice of Disagreement" with the
regional office, which will either change its decision or prepare a "Statement of the Case," the
final regional office decision. 38 C.F.R. § 19.115 (1986). See also Radiation Survivors, 589 F.
Supp. at 1318.
Fall 19861
144 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 14:141
The BVA is part of the VA but independent of its regional offices.26
The BVA is composed of sixteen panels, each with three members27 ap-
pointed by the Administrator of the VA with the approval of the Presi-
dent.28 Over two-thirds of the panelists are attorneys.2" The BVA is
authorized to make "a complete and independent de novo review of all
the evidence of record,"3 but it may not "question the legality of the
regulations and instructions of the Administrator or the precedent opin-
ions of the VA's General Counsel."'" If the BVA denies the veteran's
claim appeal and refuses to reconsider its decision, the VA's decision is
final3 2 and the veteran is precluded from receiving judicial review of the
VA's decision.33
II. The VA Attorney Fee Limitation
A. Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors
In Walters, the plaintiffs challenged the VA ten dollar fee limitation
as violative of their fifth amendment right to procedural due process34
and their first amendment rights to petition and speech.3" The plaintiffs
included the National Association of Radiation Survivors, a veterans or-
ganization which seeks compensation for veterans who participated in
atomic weapons testing and their families, and the Swords to Plowshares
Veterans Rights Organization, an organization which promotes the inter-
ests of veterans of the Vietnam War. 36 The plaintiffs also included two
26. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4009 (1982); 38 C.F.R §§ 19.1-.156 (1986).
27. Radiation Survivors, 589 F. Supp. at 1318.
28. 38 U.S.C. § 4001 (1982); 38 C.F.R. § 19.110 (1986).
29. See Milford & Simon, supra note 5, at 319.
30. Daschle, Making the Veterans Administration Work for Veterans, 11 J. LEGIS. 1, 4
(1984). See also Radiation Survivors, 589 F. Supp. at 1318:
The BVA is to base its decision for affirmance, reversal, or remand of the rating
board's determination "on the evidence and argument of record, and will not be
limited to that cited in the statement of the case." 38 C.F.R. § 19.121(b)(5) (1986).
The Board's decision should be based on a review of the entire record. 38 C.F.R.
§ 19.180 (1986). The regulations set forth no formal requirement of deference to the
determination of the rating panel.
31. Daschle, supra note 30, at 4 (referring to 38 C.F.R. § 19.103 (1986)). See also Rabin,
Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans Benefits: A Preliminary
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905 (1975): "Neither rating boards nor the B.V.A. adhere to a
system of precedent. Opinions are not published and they are not generally circulated." Id. at
922 n.65.
32. Milford & Simon, supra note 5, at 319. "A full exhaustion of administrative possibili-
ties also might include a special appeal to the administrator of the VA or an 'administrative
review' by the VA central office." Id.
33. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982). Section 211(a) by its terms does not apply to veterans
appealing decisions of the VA concerning veterans life insurance programs and small business
loan programs.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
35. U.S. CONsT. amend I.
36. Radiation Survivors, 589 F. Supp. at 1306.
individual veterans who were exposed to atomic radiation at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki after World War II. One of those veterans was a current
recipient of VA service-connected death and disability benefits facing a
reduction of those benefits who was unable to obtain legal representation
because of the fee limitation.37 The other veteran, an applicant for VA
benefits to compensate him for the death of four of his five children due
to a rare congenital disease, was also unable to obtain legal representa-
tion because of the fee limitation.38 Finally, a veteran's widow, applying
for VA benefits for her husband's death which was possibly due to his
service exposure to atomic radiation, joined as a plaintiff.39
The district court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the
VA's enforcement of the limitation because the plaintiffs had shown "a
high probability of succeeding in their argument."'' 4 The VA immedi-
ately appealed to the Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction over a dis-
trict court interlocutory decree holding an Act of Congress
unconstitutional.41
A plurality opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist and joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and White, held that the limita-
tion was not unconstitutional on its face.42
A concurring opinion, written by Justice O'Connor and joined by
Justice Blackmun, stated that while the fee limitation was not unconsti-
tutional per se, it might be an unconstitutional deprivation of due process
"as applied" to some "discrete class of complex cases," such as atomic
radiation claims, and that on remand, the district court could make addi-
tional findings regarding the plaintiffs' claims "as applied. 43
A dissenting opinion, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall, stated that the fee limitation was unconsti-
tutional on its face.' The latter two justices also claimed that the
Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over the case.45
B. Procedural Due Process and the First Amendment
1. Procedural Due Process and Government Benefits
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from de-
priving a person "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."46 Due process arises in two contexts: procedural due process guar-
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1329.
41. Waiters, 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985).
42. Id. at 3182.
43. Id. at 3197-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 3209 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 3198 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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antees that the government use procedural safeguards when it affects a
person's life, liberty or property interests,47 whereas substantive due pro-
cess is used by the Court to protect certain fundamental rights from any
congressional infringement.48
Much debate has been generated over the nature and degree of pro-
cedural due process to be afforded the claimants and recipients of govern-
mental benefits who are potentially subject to the deprivation of those
benefits by the government.49 In Goldberg v. Kelly,50 the Supreme Court
held that welfare recipients are entitled to an evidentiary hearing before
the government can terminate their benefits. The receipt of governmen-
tal benefits such as welfare is a "statutory entitlement, 1" not a mere
"privilege," 52 and "[t]he extent to which procedural due process must be
afforded the recipient ... depends upon whether the recipient's interest
in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary
adjudication."5" Although the pretermination hearing "need not take
the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial," 4 the "hearing must be 'at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' ,
Procedural due process is required only in administrative cases deal-
ing with a "life, .... liberty," or "property" interest.56 In Mathews v. El-
dridge,57 the Court established a three part balancing test to determine
47. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 451-52 (3d ed.
1986) [hereinafter NOWAK].
48. See generally id. at 331-34. This Note subjects the ten dollar attorney fee limitation to
a procedural, rather than substantive, due process analysis. The Supreme Court has been re-
luctant since 1937 to invalidate governmental action solely on the basis of the "vague" concept
of substantive due process, preferring instead to rely upon the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 368. See also id. at 350-54, 367-72.
49. See, e.g., Dolzer, Welfare Benefits as Property Interests: A Constitutional Right to a
Hearing and Judicial Review, 29 ADMIN. L. Rnv. 525, 531-46 (1977); Reich, Individual Rights
and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J 1245 (1965); Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A
Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146 (1983); Note, SpeciAing the Procedures
Required by Due Process: Towards Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing. 88 HARV. L. REV.
1510 (1975).
50. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
51. Id. at 262.
52. Id. See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); see generally supra note 49.
53. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63.
54. Id. at 266.
55. Id. at 267 (quoting Armstrong v Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
56. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). "[W]e must look not to the 'weight'
but to the nature of the interest at stake." Id. at 571 (emphasis in original). Before Roth, the
Court had only required that the interest of the claimant or recipient of government benefits be
"important." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). In Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976), the Court defined "property" as an interest created by state law or implied contract.
Id. at 344.
57. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
the process due when an administrative agency adjudication affects a
property interest in governmental benefits:
The specific dictates of due process generally requires considera-
tion of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous dep-
rivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the func-
tion involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.58
Procedural due process does not require the government to provide bene-
fits, however, when the government does decide to provide benefits it
must also provide the potential recipients of the benefits with procedural
safeguards to protect against the risk of erroneous deprivation of those
benefits.59
2. The First Amendment and Attorneys
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech ... or the right of the people peacea-
bly to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." 6 These first amendment rights are all "elements of a broad right
to freedom of expression"61 and are "equally fundamental."62 Freedom
of expression is "the security of the Republic, the very foundation of
constitutional government."6 Although the First Amendment is not ab-
58. Id. at 334-35.
59. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1492 (1985), where
the Court held that: (1) once Congress creates a property interest it may not deprive persons
of that interest without complying with constitutional standards of procedural due process,
such as notice and a hearing; (2) property rights may have a source other than the legislature
which is trying to limit them; (3) life, liberty, and property interests cannot be defined solely by
the procedures for their deprivation.
Loudermill thus rejects the plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974),
which held that an applicant or recipient of a government benefit receives a "legal entitle-
ment" and must rely solely on the statutory procedures set forth by Congress. The Loudermill
Court instead adopts the position of the concurring opinion in Arnett that "[w]hile the legisla-
ture may elect not to confer a property interest .... it may not constitutionally authorize the
deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards."
Id. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring). See also The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L.
Rav. 13, 87 (1974) ("The only interest served by such a restriction on the state's power to
design benefit programs would be to require greater candor when a legislature sought to limit
the extent of an entitlement."); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 58, 104
n.99 (1976); see generally, NOWAK, supra note 47, at 476-77.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
61. NOWAK, supra note 47, at 1004.
62. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
63. Id. at 365.
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solute,' it holds a "preferred position"65 in the Constitution. Govern-
ment restraints on first amendment freedoms are strictly construed, have
a lower presumption of constitutionality than ordinary statutes, and re-
quire a strong showing of governmental interest.66
The Court has delineated several categories of protected speech and
the consequent burdens which the government must overcome before it
may restrain an individual's first amendment rights. Political speech is
afforded the greatest protection from governmental regulation. There
must be a "clear and present danger"67 to the nation before the govern-
ment may restrain political speech, and even then the restraint must be
the least drastic means of avoiding the danger.68 Commercial speech is
entitled to a more limited first amendment protection;69 and some forms
of speech, such as obscenity,70 child pornography,71 libel,72 and fighting
words,73 are afforded no first amendment protection at all. Limited first
amendment protection extends beyond pure speech to forms of symbolic
conduct which qualify as expression.74 Whether an expression is sym-
bolic conduct or pure speech, however, is not always clear. For instance,
64. See generally NOWAK, supra note 47, at 837-39; W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J.
CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 864 (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter LOCKHART].
65. See supra note 64.
66. NOWAK, supra note 47, at 838.
67. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951): "'In each case [courts]
must ask whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such inva-
sion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.'" Furthermore, the trial court must find
that the perceived threat poses a "clear and present danger... as a matter of law." Id. at 513.
For instance, in Dennis, the Court was dealing with a perceived conspiracy to violently over-
throw the government. For a discussion of the nature of political speech, see generally Bran-
denberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
318-20 (1957). In Yates, the Court describes protected speech as "advocacy in the realm of
ideas." Id. at 320 (quoting Dennis, 341 U.S. at 502).
68. See, e.g., Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509-10.
69. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980):
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve the interest.
The Court had been initially reluctant to recognize commercial speech as entitled to any first
amendment protection. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); see generally LOCK-
HART, supra note 64, at 826-27; NOWAK, supra note 47, at 904-09.
70. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
71. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
72. See generally LOCKHART, supra note 64, at 1038-72.
73. See generally id.; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
74. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968) (the
government may restrain "symbolic speech" only if there is a substantial government interest,
and the restraint is unrelated to the content of the "speech"); see generally NOWAK, supra note
47, at 985-94; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). But see
LOCKHART, supra note 64, at 1136-46 (discussing labor picketing cases and attorney solicita-
in Buckley v. Valeo,75 the Court held that political spending by an indi-
vidual is not conduct, but speech, and as such is entitled to the highest
degree of first amendment protection. As to all forms of protected ex-
pression, the government has more latitude to regulate the time, place,
and manner of an expression than to regulate the content of the
76expression.
Without meeting the burdens required by the First Amendment, the
government may not regulate the right to speak to and through an attor-
ney, 77 even in administrative settings78 or where only nonpolitical issues
are involved.79 In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,8" the
Supreme Court held that a state could not prohibit unions from recom-
mending a special pool of attorneys to its members for industrial injuries,
because such a regulation would violate the members' first amendment
rights to free speech and association.81 In United Mine Workers v. Illi-
nois State Bar Association,82 the Supreme Court held that a state could
not prohibit a union from hiring an attorney on a salary basis because
the freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments gives the petitioner the right to
hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its members in the asser-
tion of their legal rights.
[T]he First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly
only to the extent it can be characterized as political.83
tion cases where the "speech" is so often an integral part of unprotected, nonsymbolic conduct
that it is not protected under the First Amendment).
75. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
76. See NOWAK, supra note 47, at 970-84.
77. See generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); United Mine Workers of
America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
78. UMW, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
79. Trainmen, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 5. The Virginia State Bar requested an injunction. The Supreme Court held that
the state bar regulation proscribing union recommendations violated the First Amendment
because the regulation prevented union members from "gather[ing] together for the lawful
purpose of helping and advising one another." Id.
82. 389 U.S. 217 (1967). The union had sought an attorney to represent its members in
their claims for workers' compensation, and had explicitly agreed not to interfere with the
attorney-client relationship of union members. See id. at 219-20. Members were free to hire an
attorney of their own choice. Id.
83. Id. at 221-23 (footnotes omitted).
Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded. The grievances for redress of
which the right of petition was insured, and with it the right of assembly, are not
solely religious or political ones. And the rights of free speech and a free press are
not confined to any field of interest.
Id. at 223.
At the time of UMW, the Court did not recognize commercial speech as protected under
the First Amendment, see supra note 69, and thus the right to associate for the purpose of
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The government may regulate the commercial aspects of the legal
profession,84 but "laws which actually affect the exercise of [first amend-
ment] rights cannot be sustained merely because they were enacted for
the purpose of dealing with some evil within the state's legislative compe-
tence, or even because the laws do in fact provide a helpful means of
dealing with such an evil." 85 The Court requires the showing of a sub-
stantial or compelling interest before it will uphold a governmental re-
straint on the association of attorneys with their clients.6 In Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar,87 the Court found a substantial interest in a state prohibi-
tion against in-person solicitation of potential clients by attorneys for
commercial gain;88 whereas, in In re Primus,89 the Court did not find a
compelling governmental interest to justify a state prohibition of an at-
torney's solicitation of potential clients through the mails, where the at-
torney wished to litigate an issue of public interest which qualified as a
"form of political expression," and where there was no actual harm to
the client.90 Thus, depending on the governmental interests involved and
the purposes for which the attorney was hired, the government may reg-
ulate the manner in which attorneys and clients come together but only
after it has met the burdens established by the First Amendment.
C. Procedural Due Process and the VA Attorney Fee Limitation
1. The Private Interest of Veterans
Courts use the three part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge91 to
determine whether an administrative agency is providing procedural due
process.92 Both the district court and the Supreme Court in Walters ap-
plied the Mathews test to the prohibitive effect 93 of the VA's ten dollar
attorney fee limitation.94 Applying the test's first prong to the VA's at-
petitioning the government on a "nonpolitical" matter may be entitled to greater first amend-
ment protection than commercial speech.
84. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460-62; UMW, 389 U.S. at 222; Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 6-8.
But see In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (the state's right to restrict solicitation is reduced
when vital first amendment interests are involved and the attorney is less motivated by pecuni-
ary gain).
85. UMW, 389 U.S. at 222.
86. Id.
87. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
88. The Court held that the government had substantial interests in protecting individuals
from overreaching attorneys and in avoiding unnecessary litigation. Id. at 460-61.
89. 436 U.S 412 (1978).
90. Id. In Ohralik there was no actual harm to the client. Nevertheless the state's interest
in enacting a prophylactic rule against the purely commercial activity of the attorney was held
sufficient.
91. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
92. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 127-134 and accompanying text.
94. 105 S. Ct. at 3189 n.8; 589 F. Supp. at 1310. It should be noted that neither the
district court nor the Supreme Court in Walters disputed the claim that recipients of veterans
[Vol. 14:141
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torney fee limitation weighs the private interest of veterans. 95 Many VA
disability benefits are specifically based on "indigency" or medical
need.96 In Goldberg, the Court required a pretermination evidentiary
hearing because of the "crucial" fact that termination of benefits "may
deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live." 97 The
Goldberg Court indicated that procedural due process also required that
the recipient have the right to retain counsel.9 In Mathews, however, the
Court did not extend the right to a pretermination hearing to the recipi-
ents of social security disability benefits because such benefits are
awarded on the basis of income, age, and "other factors not directly
related to financial need." 99
In Walters, the Court held that VA disability benefits "are more akin
to the social security benefits involved in Mathews than they are to the
welfare payments upon which the recipients in Goldberg depended for
their daily subsistence."" °  Unlike the Court in Mathews, the Walters
Court did not examine the specific statutory basis for awarding each of
the various veteran disability benefits.10" Yet, many of those benefits, like
the welfare benefits in Goldberg, are explicitly awarded on the basis of
need. 102
The veteran's interest in VA disability benefits is often greater than
the disabled worker's interest in social security benefits. First, unlike so-
cial security disability benefits, many VA disability benefits are based on
indigency and the presumption that the veteran or dependent has no
other means of support."13 Second, disabled workers ineligible for social
disability benefits have a "property" interest in those benefits. See 105 S. Ct. at 3189; 589 F.
Supp. at 1312-14. The district court also held that the applicants for those benefits possess a
property interest, but the Supreme Court refused to address that question since there was in
fact a recipient before it. 105 S. Ct. at 3189 n.8; 589 F. Supp. at 1313. See generally supra note
56.
95. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
96. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
97. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (emphasis in original). See supra notes 50-55 and accompa-
nying text.
98. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270 ("We do not say that counsel must be provided at the pre-
termination hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney.")
99. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340 n.24. The right to retain counsel was not discussed in
Mathews.
100. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3195.
101. By only looking to the statutory basis of a benefit, the Mathews Court may have been
myopic, for social security disability benefits, like veterans disability benefits, are in fact "the
means by which to live" for most recipients. See Popkin, The Effect of Representation in
Nonadversary Proceedings-A Study on Three Disability Programs, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 989,
1036 n.183 (1977).
102. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
103. See Gillan, supra note 11, at 840-41:
[T]he amount of the [VA] pension... [is] based upon annual income-the lower the
income, the greater the pension, and no pension [is awarded] if annual income ex-
ceeds $3,000 ($4,200 if supporting dependents) [38 U.S.C. § 521 (1986)] .... [I]n
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security benefits may often seek relief from their employers, workers
compensation, or a third party tortfeasor; veterans may not sue their em-
ployer, the United States government, for service connected injuries,10 4
nor can veterans sue the victorious or vanquished enemy.105 Third, un-
like the disabled worker, who often has had the opportunity to buy medi-
cal, disability, and survivors insurance, veterans are unable to pierce the
insurance industry's longstanding exclusion of war-related injuries.1 "6
The veteran's interest in VA disability benefits is often his or her only
remedy for a serious injury, and should therefore be considered by the
Court as an important and often crucial interest.
2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of VA Benefits and the Value of
Additional Safeguards
The second part of the Mathews balancing test weighs the risk to the
veteran of an erroneous deprivation of VA disability benefits through the
fee limitation procedure, and the value provided by the substitute proce-
dural safeguard of attorney representation. 10 7
computing income provision is made for various important disregards, including wel-
fare payments and payments by third parties toward Part B Medicare coverage. [38
U.S.C. §§ 503(2), (16) (1982); id. at § 521(d) (1986)].... Finally, provision is made
for denial or discontinuance of a pension if, in the administrator's judgment, the
veteran's net worth would render a pension inappropriate [38 U.S.C. § 522 (1982)].
See also supra note 99 and accompanying text. The Social Security Administration gives an
eligible applicant disability benefits regardless of the applicant's need.
104. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FICA), there is an exception from the general
waiver by the federal government of its sovereign immunity from suits in tort for negligence.
The FTCA excludes "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or
naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(1) (1982). In Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), the Supreme Court held that this exemption applied to all
injuries that "arise out of or... in the course of activity incident to service." Id. at 146. See
generally Cohen-Klein & Berkower, The Cancer Spreads: Atomic Veterans Powerless in the
Aftermath of Feres v. United States, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 391 (1984); Daschle, supra note 30;
Milford & Simon, supra note 5. Veterans may not sue private third parties, such as govern-
ment contractors, who were acting according to government specifications. See Stencel Aero
Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977); see also Milford
& Simon, supra note 5, at 318. Sovereign immunity still has much vitality in this area whereas
it has been largely abandoned elsewhere. See Cohen-Klein & Berkower, supra, at 403-06
nn.74, 77.
105. In the four major wars which America has fought during this century it has only
sought and received any reparations whatsoever in one, World War I, and even in that in-
stance some historians have condemned this postwar Allied effort as a cause of the subsequent
rise of Nazism and World War II. See, e.g., C. KING, A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION 875
(1969); B. COLLIER, BARREN VICTORIES-VERSAILLES TO SUEZ-THE FAILURE OF THE
WESTERN ALLIANCE: 1918-1956, at 75-76 (1964); Q. HOWE, THE WORLD BETWEEN THE
WARS 57 (1953).
106. See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW BASIC TEXT 621 (1971) (exclusion for war injuries
in the accidental death benefit of a sample life insurance policy); id. at 622 (exclusion for war
injuries in the waiver of premium benefit of a sample life insurance policy). id. at 631, 639, 648
(total exclusion of war injuries from three sample health and accident policies).
107. See supra notes 50-55, 58 and accompanying text.
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The Walters plurality put great faith in the ability of VA personnel
and the representatives of veterans organizations to ensure that veterans
receive their statutory entitlements;' °8 however, the district court record
showed that VA personnel rarely subpeona data on behalf of veterans,
rarely request independent examinations, and usually rely on veterans to
produce evidence of service-connected disability.' °9 Furthermore, VA
personnel spend an average of only 2.84 hours processing each claim and
"their performance is measured in part by the speed with which they
process claims.""'
The full-time representatives provided by veterans organizations are
well intentioned and dedicated, although overworked;". like the VA per-
sonnel, they are unable to devote the time and resources necessary to
properly assist each and every veteran making a claim. 12 In Walters, the
plurality noted that pro bono attorneys are only marginally more suc-
cessful than the representatives of veterans organizations, and concluded
that the absence of attorneys did not significantly increase the risk of
erroneous deprivation of VA benefits. 113 Yet, statistics show that attor-
neys practicing in an area of veterans law without a prohibitive fee limi-
tation' succeed in seventy-two percent of their cases, whereas the
representatives of veterans organizations succeed in only forty-eight per-
cent of their cases." 5 Most pro bono attorneys handle veterans disability
claims only sporadically and are thus unfamiliar with this area of veter-
ans law. However, the representatives of veterans organizations work
full time on VA claims and thereby develop closer longterm relationships
with VA adjudicators. Full time attorneys working in this area could
also establish the same rapport.
The plurality in Walters refused to invalidate the fee limitation for
attorneys retained to pursue complex veteran claims such as those based
on Agent Orange exposure, atomic radiation exposure, or post traumatic
stress syndrome." 6 Justice Rehnquist stated that such cases constituted
only a small percentage of all VA cases and that the district court record
did not show that the availability of lawyers would reduce the risk of
deprivation. The plurality concluded that:
Even if the showing in the District Court had been much more
favorable, appellees still would confront the constitutional hurdle
posed by the principle enunciated in cases such as Mathews to the
108. 105 S. Ct. at 3192-96.
109. 589 F. Supp. at 1320-21.
110. Id. at 1320.
111. Id. at 1321-22. See also Rabin, supra note 31.
112. 589 F. Supp. at 1321-22.
113. 105 S. Ct. at 3193.
114. For example, the upgrading of military discharges.
115. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3193.
116. Id. at 3186, 3194.
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effect that a process must be judged by the generality of cases to
which it applies, and therefore, process which is sufficient for the
large majority of a group of claims is by constitutional definition
sufficient for all of them.' 17
This suggests that what is due process in most cases is due process in all
cases. 1
18
Generally, the Supreme Court has appreciated the value of attorneys
in administrative adjudications." 9 Veterans law has many complicated
procedural aspects where an attorney's special skill would be useful in
avoiding an erroneous deprivation. 2 ' Disabled veterans must overcome
their burden of proof by providing evidence to support their claims.' 2 '
Furthermore, veterans' claims often raise complex substantive issues.'22
Attorneys are professionally trained to handle complex issues and proce-
dures such as these and their presence would serve as a valuable safe-
117. Id. at 3194.
118. The plurality also stated:
In applying... [the Mathews] test we must keep in mind, in addition to the deference
owed to Congress, the fact that the very nature of the due process inquiry indicates
that the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result
obtained in any individual case; rather, "procedural due process rules are shaped by
the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of
cases, not the rare exceptions."
Id. at 3189 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344).
The plurality rejected an analogy to the probation cases, where an attorney is provided at
the government's expense in exceptional circumstances, by noting that probation involves a
"liberty" interest, not a "property" interest. Id. at 3195.
The concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor suggests that, on remand, the district court
remained free to determine whether the fee limitation "as applied" to complex cases afforded
veterans procedural due process. Id. at 3197-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, the
concurring opinion still does not bode well for those who argue that even "ordinary" VA cases
are complicated enough for due process to require the right to retain an attorney. Id.
119. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969), the Court insisted that welfare recipients
be permitted to retain counsel because "[c]ounsel can help delineate the issues, present the
factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard
the interests of the recipient." Id. at 270-71. Similarly, in Mathews, the right of a social secur-
ity disability pensioner to retain an attorney was not questioned by either the Social Security
Administration or the Court. 424 U.S. at 339. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973),
the Court held that parolees at a parole board hearing are not generally entitled to attorneys
provided at government expense, but there are exceptions to the rule, and the Court did not
question the parolee's right to retain an attorney at his or her own expense. See id. at 787-91.
120. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
121. Radiation Survivors, 589 F. Supp. at 1319 (referring to 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(b) (1985),
and id. at § 19.172 (1986): "At all stages of a claimant's dealings with the VA the claimant is
permitted by regulation to introduce documentary, testimonial, or other evidence in support of
his claim, as well as to raise any arguments he seeks included in the record."). The veteran
must meet his or her burden of proof by submitting "evidence sufficient to justify a belief in a
fair and impartial mind that [the] claim is well grounded." Id. at 1318 (quoting 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.102 (1985)).
122. Such as whether a disability is service-connected, the degree of disability, the type of
discharge received by the veteran (and whether the veteran deserved it), the veteran's constitu-
tional rights, and the liability of third parties.
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guard in VA adjudications. 23
3. The Government Interest
The third part of the Mathews test assesses the government's inter-
est, including the burden to the government from additional procedural
requirements. 124 The Walters plurality found two governmental interests
in the ten dollar fee limitation which outweigh the risk of erroneous dep-
rivation of the veteran's vital interest in his or her disability benefits:
first, protecting the veteran's award from exorbitant legal fees;
125
and second, keeping the procedures of the VA "informal and
nonadversarial."1
26
a. Protecting the Veteran
The original intent of Congress in enacting the ten dollar attorney
fee limitation in 1864 was to protect the veteran from exorbitant
legal fees.' 7 In 1864, ten dollars was the equivalent of approximately
580 dollars today.128 Congress and the Supreme Court plurality in Wal-
ters ignored the effects of inflation, thereby effectively prohibiting the use
of attorneys by veterans rather than merely regulating attorney fees. 12 9
It may indeed be the present intent of Congress to prohibit the use of
attorneys for VA claims. Congress was informed by the VA's director in
1982 that the fee limitation "effectively precludes attorney representation
before the VA" and yet Congress has still not abolished the fee limita-
tion. 130 It is true that Congress has imposed fee limitations
in other administrative settings such as Social Security,13' class
123. For instance, one complex issue in veterans disability law, arising out of the Vietnam
War, involved the exposure of servicemen and women to the defoliant commonly known as
Agent Orange, a carcinogen. See generally Daschle, supra note 30, at 6-9. Until several attor-
neys brought a federal class action suit on behalf of the concerned veterans, the VA ignored
veterans' claims for their resulting medical and financial needs. See Wagner, The New Elite
Plaintiff's Bar, 72 A.B.A. J. 44-49 (Feb. 1986). The veterans may never have received help
were it not for a federal statute providing attorney fees for successful class action suits against
the federal government. See also Daschle, supra note 30, at 8-9.
124. 424 U.S. at 334-35.
125. See Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3189-91; see also id. at 3209-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Radiation Survivors, 589 F. Supp. at 1323 n.20.
126. See Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3191-92, 3196; see also infra notes 135-145 and accompany-
ing text.
127. See Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3189-90.
128. See id. at 3210-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Popkin, supra note 101, at 1042.
130. See Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3190 n.10.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1983); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1720 (1985). See 2 H. MCCORMICK, SO-
CIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURE 384 (3d ed. 1983). The statutes require that the fee
be "the smaller of (a) 25% of the total amount of past-due benefits, (b) the amount of the
attorney's fees as fixed by the Secretary, or (c) the amount agrecd upon between the claimant
and the attorney as fee." Id. at 386.
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actions,1 32 and suits against the federal government, 133 but, unlike VA
disability benefit practice, these limitations do not make it impossible for
attorneys to support themselves.1 34 Unfortunately, to protect veterans
from exorbitant legal fees, Congress has ensured that veterans will have
no legal representation at all before the VA.
b. Keeping the VA "Informal and Nonadversarial"
The second governmental interest in the attorney fee limitation em-
phasized by the Court is keeping the VA "informal and nonadversarial."
In reality, this governmental interest consists of two separate and unre-
lated objectives: keeping VA adjudications informal and keeping them
nonadversarial. 135 Nevertheless, the Court in Walters blended the con-
cepts of informality and nonadversariality, often pairing the words, "in-
formal and nonadversarial," together, as if they were synonymous. 136 In
doing so, the Court suggests that the VA's informal procedures will make
the relationship between the veteran and the VA less adversarial.
The interests of the disabled veteran conflicts with those of Con-
gress, the VA, and VA personnel in clear and substantial ways. The vet-
eran simply wants compensation for his or her service-connected injury.
Congress, however, has two basic, but conflicting, interests regarding vet-
erans: on the one hand, it wishes to provide "'for him who has borne
the battle, and his widow and his orphan' ,,137 but, on the other hand,
like any disability insurer, it also wishes to minimize expenditures. The
government's desire to economize will always conflict with the veteran's
statutory right to compensation and his or her constitutional right to
procedural safeguards. 138 The VA and its personnel are charged with
serving the veteran,1 39 but these personnel also have a separate conflict-
ing interest in keeping their work environment at the VA pleasant, uni-
form, and efficient. This interest can often conflict with the veteran's
132. See generally 3 H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS 184-91 (1985) (describing the factors
used by a judge to determine a reasonable attorney's fee).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1982). Cf. M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATToR-
NEY FEES 5-44 (1985).
134. See Gillan, supra note 11, at 846: "A percentage limitation, which is similar to that
written into the Social Security Act, might reduce a fee otherwise chargeable, but does not
slam the law office door." See also Popkin, supra note 101, at 1037.
135. For instance, summary trials in a totalitarian country could be extremely informal, yet
the relationship between the state and the accused is very adversarial. Conversely, the gratui-
tous transfer of a deed of real property between a parent and a child involves a high degree of
formality but the relationship is nonadversarial.
136. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3191, 3196.
137. Id. at 3183 (quoting the Second Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln (1865)). See
also infra note 167.
138. See Radiation Survivors, 589 F. Supp. at 1320 n.7.
139. See supra note 14.
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need for individualized, but time consuming, assistance.140 It is not
clear, therefore, how making the VA's adjudicatory procedures less for-
mal will reduce the level of substantive conflicts existing between the
government and the veteran.
Nevertheless, to support its thesis, the plurality in Walters quotes
extensively from an article by Judge Friendly for the proposition that
informality, particularly the absence of legal counsel, will help avoid
conflict:
These problems concerning counsel and confrontation inevita-
bly bring up the question whether we would not do better to aban-
don the adversary system in certain areas of mass justice ...
While such an experiment would be a sharp break with our tradi-
tion of adversary process, that tradition, which has come under
serious general challenge from a thoughtful and distinguished
judge, was not formulated for a situation in which many thousands
of hearings must be provided each month.'41
The Supreme Court, however, ignores Judge Friendly's admonition in
the same article that the abandonment of the adversary system in "cer-
tain areas of mass justice" should only occur after the provision of a
more neutral adjudicator where "an examiner-or administrative law
judge if you will-with no connection with the agency [should] have the
responsibility for developing all the pertinent facts and making a just de-
cision."' 4 a Judge Friendly also suggested that "agencies might be offered
an option of less procedural formality if the decsionmaker were not a
member of the agency and of still less if, as in England, he were not a
140. See Rabin, supra note 31, at 919:
Arguably, of course, experience, informality, and mutual trust are indispensable at-
tributes of a system designed to handle mass claims in an expeditious manner. Un-
fortunately, it is just this atmosphere of mutual supportiveness that generates
concern over the absence of judicial review. Experience with other decisionmaking
systems teaches that where the "advocate" develops loyalty and a sense of obligation
to the decisionmaker as well as to his client, role conflict is inevitable.
See also id. at 919-20 nn.56, 60.
141. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3191-92 (quoting Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA.
L. REv. 1267, 1287-1290 (1975)). The plurality continued to quote Judge Friendly:
To be sure, counsel can often perform useful functions even in welfare cases or other
instances of mass justice; they may bring out facts ignored by or unknown to the
authorities, or help to work out satisfactory compromises. But this is only one side
of the coin. Under our adversary system the role of counsel is not to make sure the
truth is ascertained but to advance his client's cause by any ethical means. Within
the limits of professional propriety, causing delay and sowing confusion not only are
his right but may be his duty. The appearance of counsel for the citizen is likely to
lead the government to provide one-or at least to cause the government's represen-
tative to act like one. The result may be to turn what might have been a short confer-
ence leading to an amicable result into a protracted controversy.
Id. (quoting Friendly, supra, at 1287-88).
142. See Friendly, supra note 141, at 1289.
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full-time government employee at all." 143 VA regional adjudicatory
panels consist of government agency employees 1" and thus do not satisfy
Judge Friendly's requirement of independent adjudication as a prerequi-
site to the abandonment of the adversarial system by the VA.145 Judge
Friendly's advice that an adjudicative proceeding should be made less
adversarial through the use of a more neutral adjudicator before it may
be made less formal was mistaken by the Court to mean that a proceed-
ing will be less adversarial after it is made less formal. Under Judge
Friendly's analysis, the fee limitation cannot serve the governmental in-
terest in making the VA less adversarial-it merely leaves the veteran
more vulnerable to bureaucratic mistreatment in an informal, but equally
adversarial situation.
c. Minimizing Administrative Expenses
An informal VA adjudicatory process is said to serve a separate gov-
ernmental interest of minimizing administrative expenses-which is a le-
gitimate governmental interest under the Mathews balancing test.
146
Many fear that attorneys for veterans may protract litigation, cling to
formalities, consume more of the VA's resources, and force the VA to
hire extra attorneys.' 47 However, such fears are exaggerated: attorneys
would not increase administrative expenses. First, attorneys would not
143. Id. at 1279. Judge Friendly further suggested that "[d]istrust of the bureaucracy is
surely one reason for the clamor for adversary proceedings in the United States. But a better
answer may not be more insistence on adversary proceeding but less reliance on the bureau-
cracy for decisionmaking." Id. at 1279-80.
144. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. See generally infra note 211.
145. See supra notes 142-143; see also supra note 14. But see Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3186
n.6; Prygoski, Due Process and Designated Members of Administrative Tribunals, 33 ADMIN.
L. REV. 441 (1981):
Cabinet officers charged by Congress with adjudicatory functions are not assumed to
be flabby creatures any more than judges are. Both may have an underlying philoso-
phy in approaching a specific case. But both are assumed to be men of conscience
and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the
basis of its own circumstances.
Id. at 449 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1940)). The Supreme Court
has also stated:
The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions nec-
essarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a
much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must overcome a presumption
of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that,
under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, confer-
ring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of
actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due
process is to be adequately implemented.
Id. (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1974) (emphasis added)).
146. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 ("the government's interest [which may be considered in-
cludes] the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail.").
147. See generally supra note 141.
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want to protract litigation if it were not in the veteran's best interest-the
attorney, as well as the VA, owes the veteran a fiduciary duty. Since the
attorney's fees would come only from an award, speedy resolution of
claims would be encouraged.1 48 Second, the use of attorneys would not
inhibit the truthfinding process because an attorney cannot ethically dis-
tort the truth.149 Furthermore, the VA already has the veteran's service
records and may use the discovery process to compel a medical examina-
tion or copies of the veteran's post-service medical files.' ° Third, attor-
neys would have fewer formalities in veterans law to protract
proceedings than they have in civil law.'51 Fourth, attorneys are trained
negotiators as well as litigators. The legal profession emphasizes negotia-
tion 52 and most cases are settled rather than litigated. 53 Finally, any
additional litigation that reduces the risk of erroneous deprivation still
serves the primary governmental interest in providing for disabled
veterans.
In summary, after applying the Mathews test to the fee limitation,
the veteran's private interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation are
more substantial than recognized by the plurality in Walters, whereas the
governmental interests in the limitation are more illusory than real.
D. The First Amendment Applied to the VA Attorney Fee Limitation
Prior to Walters, the Court never addressed the government's power
to effectively prohibit a person from retaining an attorney with his or her
own resources. The Walters Court avoided a detailed first amendment
analysis by finding that the veteran's "First Amendment arguments, at
base, are really inseparable from their due process claims,"' 54 and the
veterans organizations were only rearguing their claim that veterans are
148. There are neither punitive damages nor damages for pain and suffering in veterans
law. The only relief available to the veteran is compensation, a pension, and medical expenses.
See generally supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. Furthermore, it must be assumed that
if Congress were to abolish the present ten dollar fee limitation it would still retain some
moderate fee controls as it does in other administrative settings. See supra notes 131-133; see
also infra note 168 and accompanying text.
149. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-27, DR 7-102(A)(5)
(1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983): "In an ex parte pro-
ceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse." Id. at
Rule 3.3(a)(4)(d). See also id., Preamble: "As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous
to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others."
150. 38 U.S.C. § 3311 (1982). See generally Popkin, supra note 101, at 1027-28.
151. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 21-33 and accom-
panying text.
152. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 149, Preamble.
153. See generally L. KANOWiTZ, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1986). Only 5-
10% of all cases filed reach court, and the vast majority are settled. There are many additional
disputes which are settled by attorneys prior to the filing of a claim. Id. at 7.
154. 105 S. Ct. at 3196-97.
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denied " 'meaningful access to the courts.' "155 Indeed, the rights of due
process and free expression are related: the " 'fundamental requisite of
due process'" is the right to be heard;' 56 and the First Amendment pro-
tects the right to speak freely. Furthermore, it is through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause that the right of free expression is pro-
tected from state regulation.1 57 However, the right of free speech is not
limited to or diminished in the courtroom, nor is due process limited to
matters of expression. Moreover, before it may restrain first amendment
rights, the government must show a compelling or substantial interest; 58
whereas to comply with procedural due process it need only show that
the governmental interest is greater than the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion to the private interest.159
In Walters, the plurality found that the governmental interests in
the fee limitation were "significant" but held that "the constitutional
analysis of a regulation that restricts core political speech ... will differ
from the constitutional analysis of a restriction on the available re-
sources of a claimant in government benefits proceedings."' 60 The plu-
rality did not elaborate on how the analysis would be different, but
implied that the right to spend money on a lawyer in a benefits proceed-
ing does not have as high a degree of first amendment protection as that
accorded to political speech by the Court in Buckley n. Valeo."' In
Buckley, the Court held that the right to spend money on political causes
was pure speech protected by the First Amendment.
1 62
The government regulations in UMW, Trainmen, Ohralik, and
Primus involved only the manner in which an attorney could solicit po-
tential clients,16 3 yet, in Walters, the Court holds that an individual's
very ability to retain an attorney is not entitled to first amendment pro-
tection. In UMW and Trainmen, the Court also held that the right to
hire an attorney is protected by the First Amendment regardless of
whether the attorney is hired for political purposes.
The Walters plurality did not acknowledge the similarities between
the veteran's situation and the worker's situation in UMW and Train-
men. The veteran and the worker are both injured parties seeking relief
from their employers in informal administrative systems designed to pro-
tect them from exorbitant legal fees. The Walters plurality distinguished
UMW and Trainmen as follows:
155. Id. at 3197.
156. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
157. See generally NOWAK, supra note 47, at 361-67.
158. See generally supra notes 60-74.
159. See supra text accompanying note 58.
160. 105 S. Ct. at 3197 n.13.
161. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
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[T]hose cases involved the rights of unions and union members to
retain or recommend counsel for proceedings where counsel were
allowed to appear, and the First Amendment interest at stake was
primarily the right to associate collectively for the common good.
In contrast, here the asserted First Amendment interest is primar-
ily the individual interest in best prosecuting a claim ... .
This distinction has three flaws. First, as a technical matter, counsel for
the veteran is "allowed to appear" before the VA, just as counsel was
allowed to appear in the workers' compensation proceedings in UMW.
Second, in UMW, the Court specifically described the "litigation in ques-
tion" as "solely designed to compensate the victims of industrial acci-
dents,"16 and rejected the contention that first amendment protection is
"applicable only to litigation for political purposes."166 Third, in Walters,
the interest involved was more than just the individual interest in prose-
cuting the claim: veterans benefits promote important national defense
interests by assuring future soldiers and veterans that they will be pro-
vided for if injured during service.167
Thus, the Walters plurality should have considered the first amend-
ment issue separately from the due process issue; and upon closer analy-
sis, the plurality should have adopted the principle of UMW and
Trainmen-that the First Amendment requires the government to show
a substantial or compelling interest before the Court will uphold a re-
straint on the association of attorneys and clients. In Walters, no such
interest was found and thus the fee limitation should not have been
upheld.
E. The Fee Limitation-A Proposal
Congress should replace its prohibitive fee limitations with moder-
ate ones based on the size of the veteran's or dependent's award, the
work expended, and the level reached by the claim in the VA's adjudica-
tive process. 168 Moderate fee limitations would reduce the risk of errone-
164. 105 S. Ct. at 3196.
165. 389 U.S. at 223.
166. Id.
167. See Veterans Health Care Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-160, § 501, 97 Stat. 1005
(1983):
The Congress finds that-
(1) the Nation has an historic and deeply-rooted commitment to providing benefits
and services to those who served in the Armed Forces;
(2) this commitment must be continued and maintained, both to fulfill moral obliga-
tions to those who served in the past and to assure current and potential members of
the Armed Forces that the Nation's obligations to those who serve will always be
honored.
168. An appropriate limitation would be a maximum of 5% of the veteran's award if the
claim is resolved before a hearing, 15% if it is resolved during the hearing, and 25% if it is
resolved upon appeal to the BVA, with a maximum fee of $1,500 per veteran's injury. An
attorney should not receive a fee if there is ultimately no award. Although these limitations
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ous deprivation to disabled veterans and their dependents by encouraging
more attorneys to practice veterans disability law on a daily basis. Mod-
erate fee limitations would at the same time protect veterans from exorbi-
tant fees, which would be consistent with Congress' original intent in
enacting the limitation. The VA would not need to hire additional attor-
neys since the regional rating boards and the BVA already have attor-
neys. 169 Furthermore, veterans' attorneys would save VA resources by
facilitating orderly proceedings and replacing VA personnel as the vet-
eran's advisor. 170 The present fee limitation only saves VA resources, not
insubstantial, by increasing the level of benefits erroneously deprived
without due process from those who are entitled to them.
Moderate fee limitations would also eliminate the serious threat
which the VA's uniquely prohibitive fee limitation poses to the first
amendment rights of veterans and all Americans-to speak to and
through an attorney. Unlike other government regulations of attorneys
which only restrain the manner in which persons may retain attorneys,
the VA fee limitation eliminates a person's very ability to retain an attor-
ney. 17 1 Lifting this prohibitive fee limitation will prevent it from acting
as a precedent to be followed in other settings.
In workers' compensation law, where similar medical-legal issues of
disability and causation arise and where informal procedures are also en-
couraged, 72 attorneys facilitate compensation and are therefore only
subject to moderate fee controls. 173 Moreover, in workers' compensation
law, a neutral party, the state, adjudicates workers' claims against their
employers, whereas in veterans law, the veteran's claim against his for-
mer employer, the government, is adjudicated by the VA, which has a
direct financial interest in the outcome of the claim. 17 4
III. Preclusion of Judicial Review of VA Adjudications
A. Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Decisions
Neutral adjudication is an essential element of the constitutional re-
might still discourage an attorney from undertaking complex individual claims, they are simi-
lar to other moderate fee limitations established by the federal government in other settings.
See, e.g., supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 23, 29 and accompanying text.
170. As the Court in Goldberg observed, attorneys can help adjudications proceed in an
orderly manner. 397 U.S. at 270-71.
171. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
172. See generally 3 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSAXTION 15-1 to 15-78
(1983).
173. See generally id. at 15-672 to 15-716 (as to necessity for attorneys); id. at 15-639 to 15-
703 (as to fee controls).
174. If workers' compensation used VA procedures, employees would rely solely on union
representatives and only employers would compose the workers' compensation boards.
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quirement of procedural due process. 175 Judge Friendly's proposal, dis-
cussed above, suggests that the provision of more neutral adjudication is
a better way of ensuring procedural due process than the provision of
formal and adversarial proceedings. 176 Granting the veteran access to
judicial review would presumably be one way of providing veterans with
a more neutral adjudication consistent with Judge Friendly's proposal. 117
The veteran seeking disability benefits is currently precluded from ap-
pealing the findings of the VA to a federal court. 178 All adjudicative deci-
sions of the VA "on any question of law or fact under any law
administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for vet-
erans and their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and
no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or
jurisdiction to review any such decision."' 179
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[tlo constitute Tribu-
nals inferior to the Supreme Court"'8 0 and provides that "the judicial
Power shall extend.., to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party" '181 and "the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regula-
tions as the Congress shall make."' 8 2  Congress can limit 1 3 -or with-
hold' 84 lower federal court jurisdiction to determine federal questions
and regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.'85 Con-
gress may also vest decisionmaking authority in governmental agen-
cies, 116 as well as limit or deny judicial review of those agency decisions
175. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). See also Prygoski, supra note 145, at
453; NOWAK, supra note 47, at 501; Hahn, Procedural Adequacy in Administrative Decision-
making: A Unified Formulation, 30 ADMIN. L. REv. 467, 500-04 (1978); see generally infra
note 239.
For the proposition that a neutral adjudicator is one of the more primary of the essential
requirements of due process, see Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U.
CH. L. REV. 739, 750-52 (1976).
176. See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
177. Of course, access to judicial review would necessitate effective access to an attorney.
See Rabin, supra note 31, at 920.
178. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982).
179. Id.
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
181. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
182. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ci. 1-2.
183. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
184. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
185. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); see generally C. WRIGHT, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 35 (1983) ("The orthodox view... is that Congress possesses
plenary power to confer or withhold appellate jurisdiction.").
186. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3334 (1985) ("Congress
is not barred from acting pursuant to its powers under Article I to vest decisionmaking author-
ity in tribunals that lack the attributes of Article III courts"-life tenure and no reduction in
compensation during tenure). Cf infra note 217.
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affecting private interests.1 8 7 In Ex parte McCardle,1"' the Supreme
Court held that Congress could deny the Supreme Court the authority to
review habeas corpus proceedings.189 Thus, if Congress can deny appel-
late jurisdiction where a strong liberty interest is involved, then arguably
it can preclude judicial review of agency decisions concerning govern-
ment benefits.
The Court, however, might not follow McCardle today if Congress
sought to deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over important con-
stitutional questions.19 In Johnson v. Robison,'91 the Court indicated
that a congressional statute seeking to deny the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over important constitutional issues would "raise serious
questions concerning the constitutionality of" the statute.'92 In any
case, the VA's preclusion of judicial review does not extend to controver-
sies involving constitutional issues, but only to issues of law and fact aris-
ing "under any law administered by the Veterans Administration." 193
Therefore, the VA's preclusion of judicial review of VA adjudications is
constitutional.
B. The Utility of Agency Preclusion of Judicial Review
"[J]udicial deference to an agency's interpretation of 'its' statute is
surely the norm in contemporary administrative law."' 94 Preclusion of
judicial review is merely a strong form of congressionally imposed judi-
cial deference to agency autonomy. Congress totally precludes judicial
review of Medicaid195 and VA adjudications, while it partially precludes
judicial review of Social Security Administration adjudications.' 96 Most
federal agencies, however, are subject to full judicial review although the
187. See supra note 186; see also infra note 208 and accompanying text.
188. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
189. Id. at 512-15.
190. There has been little opportunity for the Court to reaffirm McCardle because Con-
gress rarely restricts the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over federal agencies. See C. WRIGHT,
supra note 185, at 39.
191. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
192. Id. at 366. But see id. at 366 n.8.
193. See 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982).
194. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
598 (1985).
195. See H. MCCORMICK, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES 510
(1977) (see also Supp. 1984, at 168).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982), which requires that:
The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been denied by the Secretary or a decision
is rendered under subsection (b) of this section which is adverse to an individual who
was a party to the hearing before the Secretary, because of failure of the claimant or
such individual to submit proof in conformity with any regulation prescribed under
subsection (a) of this section, the court shall review only the question of conformity
with such regulations and the validity of such regulations.
See also H. MCCORMICK, supra note 131, at 336.
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reviewing court must defer to agency determinations of fact which are
supported by "substantial evidence" and are not "arbitrary [and] capri-
cious." 197 There is a strong debate over the desirability of judicial defer-
ence to "administrative discretion." ' The following factors should be
considered in deciding whether Congress should continue to totally pre-
clude judicial review of VA decisions.
L Interpretive Skills
Some commentators argue that, in the general business of interpret-
197. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982):
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of
this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by stat-
ute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo
by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of preju-
dicial error.
See also D. BARRY & H. WHITCOMB, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRA-
TION 100-02, 118-19 (1981).
198. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1971). Some writers argue that "in
our system of remedies, an individual whose interest is acutely and immediately affected by an
administrative action has a right to secure at some point a judicial determination of its valid-
ity." D. BARRY & H. WHITCOMB, supra note 197, at 71. See also Diver, supra note 194, at
551. Others argue that judicial review of agency decisions is a "mischievous abstraction" and
that "[t]here is no such thing as a common law of 'judicial review' in the federal courts." D.
BARRY & H. WHITCOMB, supra note 197, at 71.
Nineteenth century cases adopted the latter position and presumed that an agency deci-
sion was not reviewable. Id. at 71-72. In Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840),
the Court refused to adjudicate whether a veteran's widow was entitled to a government pen-
sion, stating that judicial interference in executive departments would "be productive of noth-
ing but mischief." Id. at 516. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Court has
retreated from this presumption against reviewability. D. BARRY & H. WHITCOMB, supra
note 197, at 72-73. Professor Jaffe, a strong proponent of judicial review of agency decisions,
has described the present attitude of the Court as follows: "Congress, barring constitutional
impediments, may indeed exclude judicial review. But judicial review is the rule. It rests on
the congressional grant of general jurisdiction to the article III courts." Id. at 73 (quoting L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAl. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 344 (1965)).
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ing statutes, courts have more expertise than agencies.1 99 But it has also
been argued that "judicial methods of unearthing legislative intent are
primitive and naive given contemporary standards of social science.
Courts rely almost exclusively on the recorded public statements of im-
mediate participants in the legislative process, and almost never probe
into legislators' unspoken motives."200 "Agency decisionmakers often
have direct knowledge of the circumstances surrounding enactment of
the statutes that they administer,"20 1 for they often enact agency rules,
propose statutory changes, and answer legislative and public inquiries, in
addition to their role as adjudicator.20 2 Consequently, agency deci-
sionmakers are better than courts at understanding "[w]hether the legis-
lature intended to speak in 'ordinary' or in technical language."203
Agency decisionmakers have more technical expertise than courts in the
factual milieu of their agency's law. 2°
2. Legislative Control of Agency Policy
To effectuate its legislative policies, Congress controls the adminis-
trative agencies which it creates by retaining in itself a voice in the ap-
pointment of agency rulemakers and agency adjudicators-collectively
known as agency decisionmakers. When federal judges intervene in the
agency rulemaking and adjudicatory processes, Congress loses control
because federal judges are appointed for life on the basis of general judi-
cial qualifications, constitutional philosophy, and integrity-not on the
basis of their attitudes in any one field of administrative law. With
agency decisionmakers of limited tenure, Congress can better focus its
investigation of candidates and their attitudes toward the specific con-
gressional policies involved. Once appointed, federal judges "are un-
likely to be especially responsive to the wishes of current legislatures. "205
199. Diver, supra note 194, at 578.
200. Id. at 574.
201. Id. at 575.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 577.
204. See D. BARRY & H. WHITCOMB, supra note 197, at 118:
It remains true, however, that to the extent that the validity of a particular adminis-
trative ruling depends on practical experience with individual circumstances, rather
than on guidelines extrapolated from a statute through the customary tools of con-
struction, the arguments in favor of deference to an agency (which we have shown to
be substantial even on "legal" questions) become far more compelling.
But see Schwartz, Administrative Law in the Next Century, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 805, 831 (1978):
The limitations of the expert-inability to see beyond the narrow confines of his own
experience, intolerance of the layman, and excessive zeal in carrying out his own
policy regardless of the cost to other, broader interests of society-are subjected
under our system to the trained scrutiny of the non-expert judge, who, uninfluenced
by professional bias, is able to take a view broader than mere promotion of adminis-
trative policy in the particular case without regard for the ultimate cost.
205. Diver, supra note 194, at 581. Professor Diver points out that judges have life tenure
and a guaranteed salary, and he further observes that judges are at the ape, of their career and
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Indeed, allowing the judiciary a free hand in determining legislative-ad-
ministrative policy may actually weaken the ability of the people to gov-
ern themselves through Congress.20 6
Two objections have been raised against legislative-administrative
independence from judical review. First, private parties, it is argued, de-
serve a day in court before a judge.20 7 However, administrative adjudica-
tory panels are courts: they decide in a neutral manner whether the facts
and law of a case justify satisfaction of a particular claim.20 1 Most of
these administrative courts are presided over by what are known as Ad-
ministrative Law Judges (ALJ's) 09 who are well paid and carefully se-
lected in a manner similar to that of traditional judges.210 Second, it is
argued that the limited tenure of most ALJ's make them too partial to
may have foregone power and prestige to promote a "personal conception of the public good."
To do so, they "would presumably prefer to be freed from the bonds of the enactor's intent."
Id.
206. Note, Judicial Intervention and Organization Theory: Changing Bureaucratic Behavior
and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513, 515 n.1 1 (1980) (" 'excessive reliance upon courts instead of self
government through democratic processes may deaden a people's sense of moral and political
responsibility for their own future.'" (quoting A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 103 (1976))).
207. Justice Brandeis once noted that "[t]he supremacy of law demands that there shall be
opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and
whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly." Saint Jo-
seph Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
208. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 105 S. Ct. 3325 (1985), the Court
noted: "Many matters that involve the application of legal standards to facts and affect private
interests are routinely decided by agency action with limited or no review by Article III
courts." Id. at 3334.
209. For a brief history of the ALU designation, see Schwartz, supra note 204. ALU's were
first called "referees," "hearing officers," and "examiners." Beginning in the late 1940's there
were several unsuccessful attempts in Congress to have the examiner's title match the actual
judicial powers his office entailed. Finally, in 1972 the Civil Service Commission promulgated
a regulation that made the change. 5 C.F.R. § 930.203a (1978). "By a simple administrative
stroke of the pen the federal agencies were endowed with a full grown administrative judici-
ary." Schwartz, supra note 204, at 821. In 1978 there were 997 AL's. Id. at 822. See also id.
at 823:
The recent rise of the federal administrative judiciary indicates that the administra-
tive law of the next century may follow the pattern of the executive tribunals of three
centuries ago. The justice now dispensed by the agencies will become truly judicial-
ized and administered by judges possessing solely judicial authority. Our administra-
tive law will then become as much a part of our ordinary law as has the law of equity
which was originally developed by the Court of Chancery.
210. Gladstone, The Adjudicative Process in Administrative Law, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 237,
243 (1979):
[T]he top ranked ALJ today draws a salary of $47,500 per year. He has been care-
fully handpicked on a merit basis that surpasses in rigor the inquiry into the qualifi-
cations of a Federal District Court Judge. It is time either to acknowledge the
capability of the ALJ to judge in every sense of the word and office and let him earn
his salary, or stop throwing this money away.
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the government and public interest.21 I However, where an ALJ adjudi-
cates an issue involving a claim by one private party against another and
a public interest is implicated, a certain partiality to the public interest is
probably desirable. But where a private party asserts a pecuniary
claim212 against the government, an ALJ's lack of neutrality could pre-
vent a fair hearing. VA procedures do not satisfy the standard of neu-
trality suggested by Judge Friendly for administrative adjudications. 214
The VA claims examiners and regional adjudicators are government em-
ployees and the panelists at the BVA are appointed solely by the VA ad-
ministrator with the approval of the President, but without the advice
and consent of the Senate.215 Furthermore, the judicial powers of VA
adjudicators are sharply curtailed.216 These factors have led some to pro-
pose that Congress grant veterans access to Article III federal judges
who, due to the independence guaranteed them in the Constitution,217
are arguably more neutral than VA adjudicators. 218 However, judicial
review of VA adjudications is not the only way to ensure that veterans
receive neutral adjudication.219
3. Reducing the Burden of the Court
The amount of federal litigation has increased explosively in the last
two decades,220 and reviewing the increasing amount of administrative
law has become a large part of a federal judge's work.221 In 1982, ap-
211. See Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary,
33 ADMIN. L. REv. 109, 110 (1981) (ALU's themselves are subject to doubts about their inde-
pendence due in part to their employment status as agency personnel). See also supra notes
143-145, 205 and accompanying text.
212. The VA, SSA, Farm Home Administration (FHA), and Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) are all examples of federal agencies where the government has a pecu-
niary interest in the outcome of agency adjudications.
213. See Friendly, supra note 141, at 1279-80.
214. See supra notes 142-143.
215. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
217. Article III of the Constitution grants federal judges life tenure and a salary that can-
not be reduced. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 185, at 40
n.2. Moreover, federal judges are not paid by the VA. See generally supra notes 23, 26 and
accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Daschle, supra note 30, at 11-14; see generally Moss, VA Judicial Review?, 72
A.B.A. J. 29 (Sept. 1986) (concerning House Resolution 525 which would lift the ten dollar
limit).
219. See infra notes 234-240 and accompanying text.
220. See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAl. VIEW"' 15-55 (1973); Alsup
& Salisbury, A Comment on Chief Justice Burger's Proposal for a Temporary Panel to Resolve
Intercircuit Conflicts, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359 (1984); Rosenn, Trends in Administration
of Justice in the Federal Courts, 39 OHIo ST. L.J. 791, 793, 795 nn. 9, 20 (1978) (between 1962
and 1977 the number of cases before the federal courts of appeal rose 296% whereas the
number of judges therein rose only 24%).
221. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 220, at 797-98.
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proximately one-third of the Supreme Court's cases primarily involved
issues of administrative law.222 The growing complexity of administra-
tive law in each of the numerous agencies makes it increasingly difficult
for federal judges to master the law of any one agency.
Numerous solutions have been proposed to reduce this burden. One
proposal would create a fourth level in the federal judiciary-a National
Court of Appeals-which would screen certain types of cases,22 3 and re-
solve intercircuit disputes.224 This new court, however, would have three
serious drawbacks: it would continue to lack expertise in administrative
law due to its general subject matter jurisdiction; it would still be less
accountable to congressional policy than agency courts are;2 25 and it
would create the extra expense of an additional layer of appellate review.
A second proposal envisions a National Court of Administrative
Appeals.226 This court would be given appellate jurisdiction over most
agency adjudications, permitting the rest of the federal judiciary to con-
centrate on constitutional, civil, and criminal cases. However, this pro-
posal has the same deficiencies, albeit to a lesser degree, as the previous
proposal.
A third proposal suggests that the federal courts afford more defer-
ence to administrative determinations while still permitting access to ju-
dicial review.227 In other words, this proposal envisions deference just
short of preclusion. Nevertheless, the possibility of review inevitably
leads to the continued utilization of that review,228 thus maintaining the
burden on the courts.
A fourth proposal would follow the example of the VA, the Court of
222. Hellman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will it Work?, 11 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 375, 452-55 (1984).
223. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE LOAD
OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972) (reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573 (1973)). Another study pro-
posed that, instead of permitting this new appellate court to screen petitions to the Supreme
Court, the Court should first review its petitions and then refer some to the new appellate
court. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975) (re-
ported in 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975)); see generally Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the
Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634 (1974).
224. See Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442 (1983); see
generally Alsup & Salisbury, supra note 220.
225. See supra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
226. Cf Rosenn, supra note 220, at 798. This proposal has attained partial realization with
the creation in 1982 of the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; see generally C.
WRIGHT, supra note 185, at 17.
227. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 220, at 182-88; Rabin, supra note 31, at 921-22.
228. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. A claimant who has already expended the
energy and other resources bringing his claim to the highest adjudicatory body in an agency
may very well risk the marginal additional expense of filing an appeal to a federal court even if
that court will accord the agency the greatest deference.
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Claims, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 221 where special-
ized courts have to varying degrees retained exclusive and final jurisdic-
tion over their respective subject matters.23° This proposal envisions
separate sets of mini-supreme courts, where only constitutional issues are
subject to review, and is modeled loosely "on the French system of ad-
ministrative courts. 2 3 1 Judge Friendly found much to recommend in
this proposal but felt that it did not quite overcome the presumption in
favor of the status quo.23 2 Nevertheless, his actual proposals for a tax
court and a patent court with exclusive and final jurisdiction except as to
"substantial constitutional" issues are very much in the direction of the
specialty courts proposals.2 3
C. The Need for Neutral Adjudication in the VA-A Further Proposal
VA administrative adjudicative procedures should be made as neu-
tral as possible where the government has a direct pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the hearing.234 Congress, however, should not attempt to
do this by establishing judicial review of VA adjudicative decisions. The
federal courts lack administrative expertise235 and accountability to Con-
gressional policy in the agency.236 The number and nature of VA appeals
would also place a new and substantial burden on the courts. 2 3 7 Finally,
the veteran would suffer from the delays resulting from these appeals238
and the veteran's counsel would suffer from the confusion produced by
intercircuit rivalries.239 Instead, Congress should make the VA adjudica-
tive system itself more neutral.
229. In 1982, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was merged into the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See generally supra note 226; C. WRIGHT, supra note 185, at
43.
230. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 220, at 182-83; see also Friendly, supra note 223, at 643-
44.
231. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 220, at 182. See generally Arner, Establishing a Social Se-
curity Court-An Alternative to Nonacquiescence?, 1984 DET. C.L. REV. 907, 910: "The
Center [for Administrative Justice] stated that such a specialized court had 'clear advantages'
over a 'federal judiciary that is institutionally incapable of producing uniform precedents
through Supreme Court review of any but the most significant issues of interpretation.'"
232. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 220, at 183 ("So radical a change from centuries of tradition
could be justified only by proof that our system has not worked in the past or that it cannot be
expected to work in the future." Judge Friendly felt that neither "proposition can be
established.").
233. Friendly, supra note 223, at 642-43.
234. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.
238. See generally Wright, Musings on Administrative Law, 33 ADMIN. L. REv. 177, 179
(1981).
239. See Diver, supra note 194, at 585-87.
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The VA and BVA adjudicatory systems could be made more neutral
as follows: (1) adjudicators should not be VA employees; (2) VA adjudi-
cators should be given longer tenure and afforded a salary similar to that
of Article III judges; (3) regional adjudicators should be appointed by the
BVA, not the VA; (4) BVA panelists should be appointed under Congres-
sional guidelines allowing for greater input from veterans' groups; (5) the
BVA should be given the exclusive power to interpret veterans' statutes
and regulations; and (6) regional VA adjudicators should only consist of
one instead of three AL's, and the present "legal specialists" should be
made the VA's representative before the ALJ when the VA contests a
claim.
In a manner similar to the way Article III increases the indepen-
dence of the federal judiciary, the first five of these proposals would neu-
tralize veterans disability law by reducing sources of external pressure on
veteran adjudicators, such as vulnerability to removal from office, the
enticements of promotion and compensation, and the adjudicators' ap-
pointment method. By lodging the adjudicatory function solely in the
BVA and leaving the investigatory function in the VA, the sixth element
of the proposal would free the VA from its present schizophrenic role of
acting as judge, prosecutor, defendant, and friend of the plaintiff, while
attempting to serve the often conflicting interests of the government and
the veteran.2' The VA would be able to serve the single governmental
interest of keeping expenditures to a minimum by investigating veterans'
claims and, in cases involving questionable claims, opposing them before
a neutral BVA. Finally, this proposal does not have any of the draw-
backs inherent in judicial review, as discussed in the previous section.24'
Conclusion
The right to retain an attorney and the right to a neutral adjudicator
are two fundamental elements of procedural due process. In holding that
the VA's ten dollar attorney fee limitation affords veterans and their de-
pendents an adequate measure of procedural due process as guaranteed
240. See generally Gladstone, supra note 210, at 242:
[T]he presiding judge is forced to wear at least three hats. He must sometimes be
government counsel; he must sometimes be a case investigator; and he must some-
times function as the claimant's counsel. This puts the judge in an untenable position
and deprives him of the opportunity to properly perform his true function.
See also Popkin, supra note 101, at 991-92; Prygoski, supra note 145, at 460-64.
Congress often combines an agency's rulemaking, adjudicatory, and prosecutorial author-
ity in the hands of one body-for example, the SEC, the ICC, and the FTC. This policy
appears to have been the response of Congress to the unfortunate early experience of the Com-
merce Court of 1910-1913. Created as a judicial counterweight to the ICC, the Commerce
Court was quickly abolished when it was perceived to have fallen into the hands of the rail-
road interests. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 220, at 153-54; C. WRIGHr, supra note 185, at
18-19.
241. See supra notes 199-233 and accompanying text.
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under the Constitution, the Walters Court misapplied the Mathews bal-
ancing test. The Walters Court did not recognize the strong risk of erro-
neous deprivation which the prohibitive fee limitation poses to the
veteran's vital interest in his or her VA benefits. The Court instead chose
to emphasize the governmental interests of "keeping" the VA "nonadver-
sarial" and of reducing administrative expenses. In doing so, the Court
ignored the strong conflict of interest between the veteran and Congress.
The ten dollar fee limitation also threatens the first amendment
rights of veterans in two respects: first, the fee limitation effectively elim-
inates in an unprecedented manner the heretofore untouched individual
right to speak to and through an attorney, whether it be for political or
nonpolitical purposes; second, it restricts the right of persons to spend
out of their own resources and on their own behalf for communicative
purposes. In refusing to strike down the fee limitation as a violation of
the First Amendment, the Walters decision could provide precedential
support for future prohibitive restrictions on the right to spend money on
an attorney in all administrative contexts where "only" a private prop-
erty interest is involved.
If veterans are to be deprived of the assistance of counsel, then the
VA's adjudicatory process must be especially neutral. Congress has di-
rected the VA in its adjudicatory function to serve the best interests of
both the government and the veteran. However, government employees
do not make particularly neutral adjudicators where the government has
a pecuniary stake in the outcome.
It would be unwise to provide veterans with access to neutral adjudi-
cation by abolishing the VA's preclusion of judicial review. Judicial re-
view would increase the burden of the already overworked federal courts,
devalue the interpretive expertise of agency adjudicators, reduce congres-
sional control of VA affairs, and create intercircuit rivalries and delay.
Instead, the VA's adjudicatory procedures should be made more neutral
from within.
This Note's proposal would restore to the veteran two important
and common procedural safeguards: the right to retain an attorney and
the right to a neutral adjudicator. Moderate fee limitations would con-
tinue to protect veterans from exorbitant legal fees while providing them
with access to attorneys. The use of attorneys by veterans would not
increase the VA's administrative expense. The additional protection to
veterans of more neutral adjudication through an independent BVA also
avoids the drawbacks of judicial review of agency decisions.
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